An HRNK Interview with Robert Collins, Author of "Pyongyang Republic: North Korea's Capital of Human Rights Denial"

Please click here to view the video. 

Q1: What was your motivation to be a leader on North Korean human rights?

Robert Collins: When I decided to retire from the army six years ago, I felt that my knowledge could be useful in writing materials that would contribute to an overall understanding of how North Korea makes its decision and to how they carry out their policies. And so, since retirement, I’ve just continued with what the army taught me to do over those decades at the end of the 20th century and doing it unilaterally. And now I’m doing it in support of HRNK.

Q2: What do you think is the relationship between human rights issues and security concerns for the U.S. – R.O.K. relationship regarding North Korea?

Robert Collins: The deplorable human rights condition of North Korea has a direct impact on their military. They have a million man army that can’t be composed of everybody in the country that is on the positive side of the political classification system—songbun. Many, if not close to half, are recruits—those that receive a denial of human rights through their entire life because they have been classified, socially and politically, as enemies of the state. Therefore, they have grown up with inadequate food, poor education, poor housing, and the opportunities that they receive in the military are very, very limited. Those in the lower songbun classifications can’t become officers. The few that do can’t go past the company grade. And even up until a few years ago, many of the individuals in the North Korean military that were regarded as low songbun—low trust on the political scale—weren’t even allowed to carry weapons because they didn’t trust them.

Q3: What is most striking to you about the structure of the Kim Regime?

Robert Collins: The Organization Guidance Department (OGD) of the Korean Workers Party is the party within the party. It is the center of power, the center of regime governing administration that compels everybody in North Korea to follow supreme leaderism and to follow supreme leader guidance. Every leader is evaluated for their ability to do that and that evaluation comes from the Organization Guidance Department or the OGD. So, it is this organization that compels the regime and the population to carry out all regime orders. For NGOs, when and if they ever have an opportunity to enter North Korea and try to help the North Korean population, they must understand that the front people they are talking to are controlled by the OGD.

Q4: How difficult is it for North Korean defectors to resettle in South Korea?

Robert Collins: The problem is that the two countries have developed a different understanding of societal norms. And so, when North Koreans come to the South, they have a problem adjusting. It’s a severe problem and the South Korean leadership is well aware of it.

Q5: Do you believe that the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex will impact human rights policy for North Koreans?

Robert Collins: The closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex leaves a lot people without a job in North Korea. Tens of thousands of people were employed in that complex so quality of living is going to be severely decreased for those individuals. At the time, that’s not President Pak’s responsibility. Her population is her responsibility. So the issue would be not so much human rights, but overall quality of life is going to deteriorate and there will be no improvement of human rights to try and make that improvement in their quality of life happen in the Kim regime.

Q6: What do you believe is the most compelling human rights issue elucidated from your interviews with North Korean defectors?

Robert Collins: Well, when you do a number of these interviews, you quickly learn that life in North Korea is very, very difficult and much of it is based in sorrow. And during these interviews, it’s compelling to watch the sorrow come out of their life story about how they got from what kind of lives they led in North Korea, how they escaped, and how they came to South Korea. These are very compelling and a lot of sorrow and unhappiness that is related to malnourishment, starving to death of family members, basic denial of human rights, and not even understanding that some of those human rights are denied. And so, over the years, one can see that these stories become even more and more sorrowful or even more and more compelling and sad. That drives one to believe that situations are just getting worse in North Korea for individuals—for populations in North Korea. The quality of life continues to deteriorate in North Korea for those that live in the provinces, particularly those in the northeast.

Q7: Do you see a time when the Kim Regime’s policy of human rights denial is no longer sustainable?

Robert Collins: Yes, as a matter of fact I do. That time would be the fall of the Kim regime. Until that time, the Kim regime will continue to carry out its aggressive policies towards the United States and the Republic of Korea, and at the same time, carry out the human rights denial for the North Korean population. Those go hand in hand. He’s got to—in his mind with the concept of Suryong-jui or supreme leaderism—compel the population to support him personally in not only the survival of the regime, but also in policies that are relevant to peninsula security issues, R.O.K.-U.S. relations, North Korea-U.S. relations, and North-South relations.


Edited by Rosa Park, Director of Programs and Editor

Original transcription by Liz Cheek, HRNK Research Intern

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Categories: committeehrnk, crimes against humanity, defector, dictatorship, DPRK, HRNK, hrnkus, humanrights, Kaesong, KIC, KimJongUn, military, NK, OGD, RobertCollins, southkorea

The Korea Society Featuring HRNK Executive Director Greg Scarlatoiu

The Korea Society
"North Korean Human Rights: Two Years beyond the COI Report"
February 18, 2016

Stephen Noerper: Welcome to the Korea Society. We’re delighted to have you here this afternoon on a very important anniversary—that of the second year since the release of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry (UNCOI) on Human Rights Abuses in North Korea. This is an area that we know many of you in our studio audience here feel very strongly about and we welcome all of our viewers online as well as those listening via podcast or watching the video. We are delighted to have with us Greg Scarlatoiu, who is the Executive Director of HRNK, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. And we are absolutely delighted to welcome a member of his Board, Ambassador Winston Lord, who is in our audience today as well.

Before we begin in our discussion with Greg, we wanted to offer a few minutes of commentary from Seoul with a frequent guest to the Korea Society, Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon, who is the South Korean Ambassador for Human Rights. He was unable to join us physically here today, but is very much with us in spirit and wanted to offer a few comments to kick us off. So, this will be about seven minutes of his thoughts on where we are at two years since the release of the UNCOI. Peter? Thank you.

Peter Stuehmke: Welcome Ambassador Lee. What do you make of the COI anniversary and current state of play?

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon: February is a very important month because it commemorates the second anniversary of the Commission of Inquiry report, which really stands as a landmark event. It really changed not only the way the international community views the North Korean human rights issues in a comprehensive way, but also, I would say that it really changed how the North Korean regime also deals and handles the human rights issue. It really, I think, was a game changer and it remains so. I think it’s very good that we’re addressing this second anniversary and really looking at so many things that were addressed by the COI report.

What has been done? And what still needs to be done? It is a very important gauge as to where we stand and what we still need to do as we move forward. We all know that crimes against humanity is one of the four major violations of international law. But the United Nations, after one year of very intensive investigation, has concluded that in North Korea, crimes against humanity are being committed and that this is something that needs to be referred by the Security Council to the International Criminal Court (ICC) so that those people who are responsible and who are committing these crimes against humanity ought to be prosecuted. It is on the agenda of the Security Council. It has been discussed in the most recent Security Council as well. So, we still need to get to the ICC, but I believe that the foundations are still there. And I think it is very important for the international community, whether it’s individuals, NGOS, churches, or whoever it may be, to keep raising these issues so that a lot of the points that have been raised by the COI can be followed up with.

Peter Stuehmke: What of the North Korean response?

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon: North Korea is responding to this issue as it’s never done so before—even at the Security Council level. For example, Ri Su-yong, who is the North Korean Foreign Minister who never came to the UN General Assembly for 15 years, all of a sudden shows up at the General Assembly and addresses the General Assembly by giving a speech. And he did that again in 2015. So, two years in a row. We see high ranking North Korean diplomats making rounds in Europe, meeting with, for example, the EU head of human rights, Mr. Lambrinidis. We have incidents of North Korea inviting Special Rapporteur Darusman to North Korea on the condition that he help to take out those conditions of referral to the ICC. This is hitting the core of the North Korean leadership because they know that now the international community is watching over them. For three years, the North Korean human rights issue will remain as an agenda item so that at any time it can be discussed. But just the fact that a North Korean human rights issue sits as an agenda item at the Security Council is a source of very significant pressure on North Korea. It's fully aware now that the UN, not only the General Assembly, but also the Security Council and the wide spectrum of the international community are scrutinizing the human rights conditions in North Korea. Increased pressure on North Korea is making North Korean violators of human rights think twice. And I think that’s a very important first step towards actual improvement in the human rights condition.

Peter Stuehmke: What of the new Seoul UN office on human rights?

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon: Just the fact that the field office was set up is a very significant development. The most important function of this office, number one, would be to continue to get testimonies and collection of data of human rights violations so that it can be kept as records for future reference. Just in case that, let’s just say, the issue does get referred to the ICC or if there is finally reunification on the Korean peninsula. There have to be measures to deal with what has happened in the past. It also serves the purpose of gathering people as a venue for discussions and trying to come up with better policies: improvement of relations so that we can actually begin to see improvements in human rights conditions in the North; just the advertisement factor; or just keeping the issue on the radar so that there’s a greater amount of media coverage. It’s very important, I think, to keep sending the message that the world is looking out.

Peter Stuehmke: What of new US sanction legislation?

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon: Once this Sanctions Enforcement Act of the US is in place, I think that it will just add to the pressure that North Korea will feel because it is about a secondary boycott. So it’s not just North Korean individuals and companies, but whoever else deals with North Korea will also be subject to sanctions.

Peter Stuehmke: And [South] Korea's human rights legislation?

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon: We remain hopeful that it will pass in the next general election. If it does, it will only add to, for example, the funding of a lot of the NGOs that do great work to deal with human rights problems.

Peter Stuehmke: And in closing, international efforts?

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon: I believe that there has to be a comprehensive global campaign. For example, what we have seen against South Africa’s apartheid system, where there was really a concerted effort made by the international community to really target South Africa to get rid of this system of constitutional segregation. And the sanctions, of course, applied to sports, culture, financial investments, and so on. I believe that it will take that kind of concerted effort by the international community to make a dent.

Peter Stuehmke: Thank you, Ambassador Lee.

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon: I hope you continue with this effort and I thank the Korea Society for all that you do. Thank you.

Stephen Noerper: And we really do thank Ambassador Lee for taking the time for that. And I’d like to thank Nikita Desai and Peter Stuehmke, part of our staff, for putting all of that together. Thank all of you for your attention.

Greg, we are honored to have you here. You are both a nationally and internationally recognized expert in this area. Your service with HRNK is remarkable as Executive Director and we’re so very pleased to have you on the stage of the Korea Society. Welcome.

What in this very eloquent and concise summary that Ambassador Lee has shared with us grabbed you the most?

Greg Scarlatoiu: Steve, first and foremost, the honor is all mine. Delighted to be here with you today and delighted that Ambassador Winston Lord is in the audience. Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon visited all of the key points pertaining to the UNCOI and implementation of the UNCOI recommendations. I was extraordinarily impressed with his remarks about the need for a campaign on par with what was done to do away with South Africa’s apartheid. Many of us may have been under the wrong impression that North Korea was one of the most sanctioned countries in the world. It is not. And the sanctions regime as it stands today only addresses counter-proliferation—efforts to counter the proliferation of North Korean nuclear and missile technology. It has nothing—absolutely nothing—to do with North Korea’s crimes against humanity or egregious human rights violations. Now, HR 757, the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act, will be most likely—surely I would say—signed by President Barack Obama. This is a piece of legislation that factors in human rights concerns. This is going to be a first. This is a very important part of the story if implementation is adequate and if others participate in implementing these sanctions.

A second point that I would like to make is that yes, a campaign on par with what was done to do away with South Africa’s apartheid is important and if we are to see that, we really need the grassroots organizations. The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea does not have that capacity. We are a research organization. Of course, there is an embedded advocacy element in everything that we do since we deal with North Korean human rights, but we need the large international grassroots human rights organizations to engage in a global campaign to end crimes against humanity and bring improvement to the North Korean human rights situation.

Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon was right on the mark in his comments on accountability and the need for accountability in North Korea. The UN Commission of Inquiry recommended that the North Korean case be referred by the UN Security Council to the International Criminal Court. As Ambassador Lee said, we’ve had good progress in 2014 and 2015. Both the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva and the UN General Assembly here in New York City had two very strong resolutions on North Korean human rights, addressing both accountability and the ICC referral. Indeed, the Security Council held two meetings on North Korean human rights. North Korean human rights was placed on the agenda. Just a couple of months ago in December 2015, our own Ambassador to the United Nation, Ambassador Samantha Power, gave, I would say, one of the most powerful speeches ever given by U.S. a government official on North Korean human rights. We begin to understand that North Korean human rights violations and crimes against humanity in North Korea pose a threat to regional and international peace and stability. Yes, we are fully aware that merely including an issue in the agenda of the UN Security Council is a procedural issue that requires 9 out of 15 votes of permanent and nonpermanent members. Now, taking up the issue is a different matter. It becomes a substantive matter subject to a veto by a P5 member (a permanent member): potentially China or even Russia. We are fully aware of that difficulty. However, one has to remember that every time China attempts to block an initiative to address the egregious human rights situation in North Korea, China places itself in a position where it’s aiding and abetting a regime that’s committing crimes against humanity. Moreover, I think we have to remember, Steve, that the North Korean Kim regime has been a master of playing one super power against another: the Soviets against the Chinese during the Cold War and arguably, after the end of the Cold War, possibly the United States against the European Union and China regarding humanitarian assistance and other issues on a smaller scale. The point that I would like to make is that this is not a comfortable position for the Kim regime. The Kim regime cannot be comfortable knowing that China is the only one standing between Kim Jong-un and referral to the International Criminal Court.

In addition to the UN Security Council referral, in his most recent report to the UN Human Rights Council submitted just a few days ago, the UN Special Rapporteur, Mr. Marzuki Darusman, reminded us that the UN General Assembly can also rely on its residual powers to establish a tribunal dealing with crimes against humanity in North Korea. If this is done in response to the Security Council’s incapacity, an inability to address a situation that poses a threat to international peace and security, this would go to the precedent of Resolution 377 uniting for peace, which we all recall in relation to the Korean War.

Speaking of Special Rapporteur Darusman’s report, another point that he makes is that one of the recommendations of the UN Security Council was to establish a panel of experts, which would examine the applicable legal standard—a panel of experts that would prepare the ground for accountability in North Korea. The point that the Special Rapporteur makes in his most recent report is that there is no amnesty for crimes against humanity. Moreover, we cannot prepare overnight. We must be prepared when faced with a contingency—with a situation that most likely will require immediate procedures pertaining to accountability. And thus, once again, the Special Rapporteur has called for the establishment of a panel of experts. An international NGO consortium or several international NGOs are sure to push in this direction. This could be another step that we could see in the near future. And of course, as emphasized by Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon, one very important recommendation of the UNCOI report was implemented: the establishment of a field office of the Office of the High Commission of Human Rights in Seoul. That office has been there just a few months. They’re already doing an extraordinary job collaborating with NGOs in South Korea and beyond, and also continuing to document human rights violations happening in North Korea.

Stephen Noerper: Thank you, Greg. That’s a very comprehensive and bold overview, and we appreciate your eloquence on that. You’ve given us a lot to work with here and I’m sure a lot will come out in the Q&A as well with those in the studio. I’d like to focus in on a few points and ask you for a bit more. One is this issue of China, where South Korea has put a tremendous amount of effort into its diplomacy and where you do have to ask the question about whether China gets to a point where there are trade-offs and whether its defense of the North Korean regime is really worth it. What are the practicalities of where you see China in terms of opposing further movement on this front? Where do you think there might be flexibility? And how does this relate to the broader security dynamic we see now given the January 6 nuclear test, the February 7 missile test, and the movement for stronger sanctions?

Greg Scarlatoiu: Now certainly, fundamentally, China is opposed at the UN to the so called “country-specific mechanisms”: UN Commissions of Inquiry and UN Special Rapporteurs. It’s not only China. It’s the Russian Federation, Venezuela, and others. Of course, the reason is simple: this establishes a precedent. Some other countries might be next. So, the point that China has made, time and time again, is that it opposes this type of country-specific mechanism, but it’s going beyond that. Of course, we could surely have a discussion about the traditional ties between the DRPK and China. We know that this has not always been a love story. There have been great times in this relationship. There have been terrible times in this relationship and in particular, during the days of the Cultural Revolution in China. China continues to be a fairly pragmatic actor. Its approach to North Korea is that it wants stability on its borders and unfortunately, under the current circumstances, China still believes that the only arrangement that can maintain stability on its border is the Kim Jong-un regime—as terrible as it might be. And I hope that China would see how terrible this regime is and what a liability it is. Secondly, China does not want to see any massive refugee inflows. Thirdly, if China can create a couple of business opportunities in the process, so be it.

Doing business in North Korea, of course, is not easy for China either and I’m speaking of those investors who go there for business reasons, for economic reasons. It’s a tough environment: bad infrastructure; the investment has to be front loaded; once you’ve front loaded it, they take you prisoner; informal taxation is a big problem; and North Korea is highly corrupt. So it’s not easy from China’s viewpoint either. Every time North Korea conducts another provocation—a missile launch or a nuclear detonation—China cannot be too happy to see U.S. B-52s, F-22s conducting nuclear bombing exercises so close to Chinese airspace. So China is not happy with North Korea, but at the same time, China has not reached a point where it’s ready to change its fundamental strategic stance on North Korea.

On human rights in particular, China could be tremendously helpful. This is a point made by the UNCOI. China forcibly repatriates North Korean refugees. Of course, China does not repatriate all North Koreans. There are North Korean workers officially dispatched to China by the North Korean government as part of their moneymaking operations. They work under terrible working conditions. This is pretty much bonded labor or forced labor; many organizations see it as slave labor. I’m speaking about those refugees who try to escape those dire circumstances in North Korea. If apprehended, they are forcibly repatriated to the North. China does this because it claims they are "illegal economic migrants" and not political refugees. It claims that many of them are in China because they are hungry and in search of economic opportunity. Are many of them in China in search of economic opportunity? Possibly, but what matters is that China is a party to the 1951 UN Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees, which stipulates that if a person has crossed an international border and upon repatriation faces a credible fear of persecution based on a political rational, then that person clearly qualifies to gain access to the process leading to acquiring political refugee status. As you know, leaving the country without the government’s approval is a criminal act in North Korea. Those returned to North Korea, in particular if they came across South Korean nationals and in particular if they came across Christian missionaries, are subjected to very aggressive interrogation and if it turns out that they did come across South Koreans or Christian missionaries, the punishment is extraordinarily harsh: imprisonment in the political prison camps or re-education camps and in some instances, even death. We’ve had terrible terrible reports, fully confirmed, of women who became pregnant with Chinese men along the road of defection. They were subjected to forced abortions and we’ve had reports of infanticide.

"...what matters is that China is a party to the 1951 UN Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees, which stipulates that if a person has crossed an international border and upon repatriation faces a credible fear of persecution based on a political rational, then that person clearly qualifies to gain access to the process leading to acquiring political refugee status."

So once again, there is a very simple step that China can take by protecting these refugees: allowing them access to the process leading to acquiring political refugee status. If China is afraid of increased numbers of ethnic Koreans in its border areas, the best way to ensure that they leave is to allow them access to this process because if they can approach the High Commission for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross, they won’t stay. They’ll leave. Probably, China’s fear here is a process similar to the “European Picnic” of 1989, when the Hungarians opened their border to East Germany and East Germans were flowing out of West Germany and this is what eventually brought about the fall of the Berlin Wall. Possibly, China might see this as opening the door to a process similar to what happened in Europe in 1989. Thus, bringing about the collapse of the Kim regime in North Korea.

Stephen Noerper: It seems, Greg, there have been two things in recent memory that have elicited a strong response from the North Koreans. One has been the restrictions around Banco Delta Asia and the other has been this and the frequent mention of ICC referral. The regime seems to be taking it very strongly and very personally. Do you have any sense or any intelligence that the behavior of the regime has at all altered in the last two years? Or that there has been any movement within North Korea relative to the camps? Has there been any easing of the gulags as far as you and the community are aware?

Greg Scarlatoiu: Unfortunately, as far as we are aware, there hasn’t been an easing on the gulags. What we have seen is a transformation of the gulag that may be related to international efforts to focus attention on North Korea’s political prison camps. As you know, there are at least four fully functional political prison camps in North Korea where anywhere between 80,000 and 120,000 people are imprisoned. A couple of years ago, one of the camps, located close to the border with China, Camp No. 22 in Hoeryong North Hamgyong Province, was shut down. It ceased to function as a political prison camp. Why? We can speculate that this happened because of international efforts to focus attention on North Korea’s gulag and also because it was so close to the border with China. It was bad PR. There were Chinese businesses in the area. There were Chinese tourists visiting the area. And also, the last thing North Korea wants is another escapee from a political prison camp managing to cross the border into China to tell his or her story about the horrors witnessed in the prison camps: the forced labor, the induced malnutrition, the torture, the rapes, the public executions, and the secret executions happening at the camps.

Most unfortunately, what we also know is that a few thousand inmates, a few thousand prisoners, went unaccounted for. We had reports from sources inside the country that they were put on trains and taken away in the middle of the night. We had reports that many of them were starved to death. They simply went unaccounted for. What we know is that other detention facilities—and this is based on satellite imagery research that we’re conducting corroborated with testimony by witnesses, former prisoners, former guards, former officials in charge of running the camps—have expanded. For example, Camp No. 25 in Chongjin, North Hamgyong province expanded pretty much twofold. These are reports by our organization, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, in collaboration with AllSource Analysis in Colorado; this is a satellite imagery company. Amnesty International and others also focused attention on Camp No. 14, for example. That facility has also expanded. It has actually expanded into the adjacent village. So, we have seen a transformation of the political prison camp system in North Korea. It may be in response to international efforts to address North Korea’s human rights situation.

Unfortunately, as pointed out in the UNCOI report itself, the Kim regime still sees these human rights violations as part of its modus operandi. These are not unfortunate side effects. These are at the very core of how the Kim regime operates.

Stephen Noerper: I know tomorrow in Washington you’re participating in a larger event. I was wondering if you could say a few words about that. And also, tell us here and to those viewing and listening, within the field, who do you consider to be the most effective actors right now? And I’m thinking primarily of suggestions in terms of the NGO world. How are they helping to move the agenda along?

Greg Scarlatoiu: Tomorrow we’ll be having an event in Washington DC hosted by CSIS, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, our second anniversary of observation of the UNCOI report. It’s a large conference and very well attended. We still have room for more attendees I hope. Basically, this is a collaborative effort. It’s us, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea; CSIS; the National Endowment for Democracy; our good and dear friend Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon and the Human Liberty Center at Yonsei University; and the George W. Bush Institute in Dallas, Texas. This event will feature experts; witnesses; Justice Michael Kirby, the former Chief Commissioner of the UNCOI; and Mrs. Sonja Berserko, another member of the UNCOI. Unfortunately, Mr. Darusman will be unable to join us this time. He was there last year. So this conference will not only focus on the celebration of the UNCOI, but we will also discuss all of these key issues, which are part of the process of moving forward. Anything from the panel of experts to possible future efforts at the General Assembly and to the “rights up front” approach put forth by the UN Commission of Inquiry as a recommendation to those UN agencies involved on the ground in humanitarian operations in North Korea.

This main conference will be followed by our first ever celebration of the memory and legacy of one of our founding board members, Dr. Fred Iklé, who is well known for having been a great American who kept America safe and developed the nuclear deterrence strategy during the years of the Reagan administration in particular. We remember Dr. Iklé as one of the founding board members of our organization and as a board member who was extraordinarily dedicated to North Korean human rights. The stars aligned and our first keynote speaker at the Fred Iklé Lecture is going to be none other than Justice Michael Kirby. This will also happen at CSIS from 4:30 to 6:00 p.m. tomorrow in Washington, DC.

Stephen Noerper: And that’s open to the public?

Greg Scarlatoiu: That is also open to the public.

Stephen Noerper: And so, other than HRNK, other bright lights in the NGO community and other people and organizations we should be paying attention to?

Greg Scarlatoiu: There are different organizations playing critical roles. What HRNK does, primarily, is to investigate and to publish on the North Korean human rights situation based on interviews with witnesses, based on satellite imagery, based on interviews with experts, and based on work out in the field. This is a very important role because this is what those engaged in advocacy need in order to move forward with their advocacy. Of course, there is an advocacy element embedded in what we do because, after all, what we deal with is North Korean human rights. But there are organizations tasked exclusively with advocacy. Their role is extraordinarily important. These are organizations that brought us the UNCOI. This was an effort, I want to say, spurred by NGOs. NGOs were also involved in efforts to push for the passage of HR 757 here in the United States, the North Korea Sanction Enforcement Act. NGOs have been fully engaged in efforts to persuade the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea to pass the North Korean Human Rights Act. This has been going on for more than 10 years now as Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon said. All we can do is hope to see this act pass.

There are NGOs that have performed, I would say, the most important role of all. These are the NGOs that have been engaged in rescuing North Korean refugees or North Korean escapees. Remember that prior to the great famine that decimated North Koreans in the mid- to late-1990s, we had just seen a handful of refugees or a handful of defectors in South Korea. The numbers have increased sharply during and after the famine, and there are now 29,000 North Koreans, or former North Koreans, living in South Korea. Without their testimony and without their courage, we would not have had the UNCOI, we wouldn’t be seeing all of these efforts going on at the UN and elsewhere. I would say that organizations tasked with rescuing, protecting North Korean refugees, and enabling them to adapt to their new life—in South Korea, in Europe, in the United States, or Canada—perform an extraordinarily important role. And I would also say that NGOs that endeavor to provide training to former North Koreans—in particular, to young former North Koreans in their teens, twenties, and thirties—perform an extremely important role. I’m not trying to say that they should all become political leaders of a reunified Korea, but they need all the help they can get to become leaders and experts in their chosen areas of expertise. This is a mosaic of organizations performing very important roles that are complementary, I want to say, at the end of the day.

Stephen Noerper: Very important. Thank you. And before I turn to the audience, let me just ask quickly if you can say a few words about your work with Radio Free Asia in that I know that support for broadcast into North Korea has been one of the primary emphases both with the new legislation and in terms of some of the debate on how to move things forward.

Greg Scarlatoiu: I want to say that my work with Radio Free Asia is a labor of love just like my work with HRNK. I have had a weekly Korean language column for the past 13 years since 2003. Initially, I was building on my own personal experiences as one who was born and raised in Nicolae Ceausescu’s Romania, and this was the one country most similar to Kim Il-Sung’s North Korea, as you recall, and also as one who had lived for 10 years on a divided Korean peninsula while living, studying, and working in South Korea. I think that broadcasting is extraordinarily important. What we all want to see on the Korean peninsula is change. And change in North Korea can only come from the people of North Korea themselves. What we can do in order to enable them to see that there are alternatives to the current political arrangement in North Korea is to tell them three basic stories.

First and foremost, to tell them the story of their own human rights situation. They don’t know it. They don’t understand it living under such an oppressive regime. Religious freedom and freedom of speech and association have all been embedded in the constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, but North Koreans never read their own constitution. That’s the story we need to tell them. We need to tell them about international obligations North Korea has assumed by being a UN member state and thus, bound by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by being a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic and Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention of Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; and the International Convention of Rights of a Child.

Secondly we must tell them the story of the corruption of their leadership, in particular, the corruption of the Kim family regime.

Thirdly, we need to continue to tell them the story of the outside world, in particular, the story of South Korea, which is, as we all know, a miraculous success story. Once one of the poorest countries in the world just a few decades ago, [South Korea is] now the world’s 12th largest economy and moreover, a liberal democracy that’s a model for others in the region and beyond. Yes, a noisy liberal democracy, but that’s how we like liberal democracies—noisy. It’s very important to keep telling these stories to North Koreans and what we know based on surveys conducted by InterMedia and other companies tasked to monitor radio broadcasts into North Korea, former North Koreans interviewed state that about one third of them did listen to foreign broadcasting while they were in North Korea. South Korean broadcasting is also classified as foreign broadcasting. So here we’re talking Radio Free Asia, Voice of America, stations based in South Korea staffed with North Korean defectors, Kookmin TV (Korea TV), KBS, and so on and so forth. So, some North Koreans are listening, but probably not one third of all North Koreans. After all, these were the North Koreans who actively sought out information from the outside world. These are the North Koreans who had the courage to escape. But, nevertheless, we’ve seen the percentage of those who state that they listened to foreign broadcasting on the increase. We have to remember that there are new media storage devices. We know that USBs, DVDs, memory chips—in particular, memory chips and USBs—are very popular in North Korea today. We know that some North Koreans are familiar with the Hallyu (with the South Korean wave), the South Korean pop culture, and soap operas. Extraordinarily important.

Stephen Noerper: Greg, thank you for this very rich hour. Before we close, I wanted to give you an opportunity to share a few thoughts on Ambassador Steven Bosworth, who passed away earlier in January. Those of you who have been with us for programs over January and February know that we have tried to make frequent mention of Ambassador Bosworth’s very deep commitment to and effort for Korea-U.S. relations. We have on our website on koreasociety.org a tribute to Ambassador Bosworth. But I know that he was a mentor and friend to you, and was wondering if you would offer a few thoughts on his guidance and contributions in your life.

Greg Scarlatoiu: Ambassador Bosworth will always be remembered as an extraordinary diplomat. To us, those who graduated from the Fletcher School, he will always be remembered as the Dean who brought the Fletcher School into the 21st century. This has always been an extraordinary school, but he has added new programs, he has brought a true sense of strategic vision, I would say into the next century as well. For that we are all grateful to him. Personally, I am extraordinarily grateful to Stephen Bosworth. It so happened that we arrived at Fletcher at about the same time—both of us from Korea. I also happened to sit on the student council and I got to meet him regularly, at least a couple times a week, and work with him very closely. He was extraordinarily supportive. He was a friend; he was a mentor; he was a role model; and his personal support went to the extent that years after my graduation from Fletcher as I was applying for a position, he picked up the phone and called my employer to provide a recommendation that was tremendously helpful. I will dearly miss Stephen Bosworth. I was deeply saddened to hear the news of his passing. And I think that the best way for all of us to honor the extraordinary legacy of Steven Bosworth is to continue performing our mission. In our case, addressing this extraordinarily difficult situation in North Korea. I’m certain that Stephen Bosworth would be extraordinarily happy to see all of us here today. And what you have done here today, Steve, is an extraordinary way of honoring the legacy of Stephen Bosworth.

Stephen Noerper: Well, thank you very much. Please join me in thanking Greg for his keen insights. We do hope that you join us at koreasociety.org to become a member or to find out about future events. We would also note that this is our twelfth program on North Korean human rights leading up to and since the UN COI, so please feel free to consult and share any of those programs, which are available online, free of charge, in both audio and video form. And we would welcome you back next Thursday for a very interesting discussion on political forecasting: Korea and regional relations that will feature Ralph Casa, the President of Pacific Forums CSIS; Victor Cha who is the Korea Chair at CSIS and Korea Foundation Professor at Georgetown University—Victor will be hosting you tomorrow in Washington; and Scott Snyder of the Council on Foreign Relations. And so, really, three of our nation’s top analysts on political and security issues. Again, 12:30 next Thursday and we look forward to seeing you then. Thank you again for your attention today. Thank you, Ambassador Lord, for sharing your time with us and we’re delighted to have you here.

Greg Scarlatoiu: Thank you.


Edited by Rosa Park, HRNK Director of Programs and Editor

Original transcription by Liz Cheek, HRNK Research Intern

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Categories: China, committeehrnk, crimes against humanity, HRNK, hrnkus, humanrights, KimJongUn, KoreaSociety, NGO, NKgulag, Sanctions, southkorea, SpecialRapporteur, UN, UNCOI, UNGA, UNHRC

Muddying the Waters: North Korea’s Deceptive Media Offensive

By Greg Scarlatoiu

Greg Scarlatoiu is executive director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) in Washington, D.C. At HRNK, he supervises, manages, and coordinates the drafting, publication, and dissemination of reports investigating the North Korean human rights situation. In close coordination with HRNK’s board of directors, Scarlatoiu shares HRNK’s findings and recommendations with UN agencies and international NGO networks. A seasoned lecturer on North Korean human rights, political security, and economic issues on the Korean peninsula, he has appeared as an expert witness at several Congressional hearings on North Korean human rights. An experienced social audit consultant, he is currently finalizing a report on North Korean workers officially dispatched overseas. For twelve years, Scarlatoiu has been authoring and broadcasting the weekly Scarlatoiu Column to North Korea for Radio Free Asia (RFA). A visiting professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS) in Seoul, he holds a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy (MALD) from the Fletcher School at Tufts University, and an MA and BA from Seoul National University, Department of International Relations. Scarlatoiu was awarded the title of Citizen of Honor, City of Seoul, in January 1999. He is fluent in Korean, French, and Romanian.

On Monday, September 21, 2015, the 30th session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva featured a panel discussion on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), including the issue of international abductions, enforced disappearances, and related matters, moderated by Michael Kirby, former chair of the Commission of Inquiry on human rights in the DPRK (UN COI). The panelists included Mr. Koichiro Iizuka, vice secretary-general of the Association of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea.

The main panel was followed by a side event featuring the tragic accounts of South Korean, Japanese, Romanian, Thai, and other nationals abducted by North Korea. The panelists included Mr. Hwang In-chul, whose father was a passenger on Korean Air Lines YS-11, hijacked by North Korean agents on December 11, 1969. Mr. Hwang's father was one of 11 passengers and crew members who were never returned to South Korea.

On the same day, CNN’s Will Ripley and Tim Schwarz published a story based on sources inside North Korea, claiming that Ms. Mun Su Gyong, a North Korean national, was allegedly abducted by South Korean agents while working as a waitress at a North Korean state-owned restaurant in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. One of the sources quoted is the former manager of the respective restaurant, who reportedly believes that South Korean spies posing as North Korean businessmen “frequented the restaurant for two years,” befriended Ms. Mun, and then abducted her, forcing her into a car and driving away. At the time of the alleged “abduction” four years ago, Ms. Mun was twenty years old. The report included an interview with Ms. Mun’s parents.

Source: CNN

By offering this story to a prominent U.S. media organization, the North Korean authorities likely attempted to counter efforts by the UN and the international community to focus attention on South Korean nationals and citizens of other countries abducted by North Korea. As we learned from an excellent David Hawk piece published by US-Korea Institute’s 38 North about a year ago, the North Korean government reacted to the highly critical report of the UN COI through: a “counter-report” by the North Korean Association of Human Rights Studies; a significantly revised approach to the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism; and a diplomatic “counter-offensive,” which involved the North Korean foreign minister appearing before the UN General Assembly for the first time in 15 years, and so-called “press briefings” focused on denial of the appalling North Korean human rights record.

By offering this story to a prominent U.S. media organization, the North Korean authorities likely attempted to counter efforts by the UN and the international community to focus attention on South Korean nationals and citizens of other countries abducted by North Korea. 

As part of the same strategy, the North Korean regime’s propaganda website, Uriminzokkiri, launched ferocious attacks against UN COI witnesses, including former political prisoners Jung Gwang-il and Shin Dong-hyuk, and also North Korean defector and scholar Cho Myung-chul, the first North Korean escapee to become a South Korean National Assembly member.

On the upside, the North Korean regime’s approach to human rights has surely changed post-UN COI. Its fundamental strategic stance on human rights used to be utter neglect. Always overshadowed by nukes and missiles, human rights would easily disappear off the radar screen of the international community, so the Kim regime knew there wasn’t much to worry about. Post-UN COI, even the North Korean regime has come to the realization that human rights is here to stay, and it can no longer just ignore attempts by UN agencies, foreign government agencies, and international NGOs to shed light on its abysmal human rights situation. Pursuant to the findings of the UN COI, North Korea is no longer seen as a bizarre relic of the Cold War, but as a post-communist, post-industrial, dynastic kleptocracy that is subjecting its own people to crimes against humanity in order to maintain its grip on power.

Post-UN COI, even the North Korean regime has come to the realization that human rights is here to stay, and it can no longer just ignore attempts by UN agencies, foreign government agencies, and international NGOs to shed light on its abysmal human rights situation.


On the downside, North Korean attempts to compromise witnesses and muddy the waters by misleading foreign media organizations will continue. Since the release of the UN COI report in February 2014, CNN has done excellent reporting on the North Korean human rights situation, and perhaps that is why it was the media organization targeted by North Korea’s deception in this case. 

In the particular case of the young North Korean woman allegedly “abducted” by South Korean agents, the story, published undoubtedly with the approval of the North Korean authorities, presents the following problems:

• The former manager of the respective restaurant claims that Mun Su Gyong had been befriended by "South Korean spies" posing as North Korean businessmen. I have interviewed former restaurant workers who escaped and found their way to South Korea. The waitresses' "befriending" customers is reportedly a big red flag for the managers running these restaurants. The girls who get too close to customers are quickly disciplined, and in extreme cases sent back to North Korea. Sustaining such "friendship" with customers, well known to other waitresses and the manager, would be impossible. One has to remember this is a tightly confined space. The waitresses work and live together under strict surveillance. They are only seldom allowed to go shopping or sightseeing, and even then only in groups, never alone. 
• With 28,000 former North Koreans already living in South Korea, including some former senior officials, there is absolutely no conceivable need for South Korean intelligence agents to kidnap North Koreans. 
• There are former restaurant workers already living in South Korea. There would be no practical need for South Korean intelligence agents to kidnap additional restaurant workers. 
• South Korea is a liberal democracy that has discarded the dark legacy of its authoritarian past. The UN Secretary-General is a South Korean national, the president of the World Bank is a Korean American born in South Korea, and South Korea contributes in many meaningful ways to international humanitarian and development assistance as well as peacekeeping operations. South Korea is not a rogue state conducting abductions of its own nationals or other countries' nationals overseas. It is North Korea that has kidnapped nationals of South Korea, Japan, China, France, Guinea, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Macau, Netherlands, Romania, Malaysia, and Singapore.

It is North Korea that has kidnapped nationals of South Korea, Japan, China, France, Guinea, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Macau, Netherlands, Romania, Malaysia, and Singapore.

To the reader interested in learning more about North Korea’s abduction of citizens of South Korea and other countries, I highly recommend HRNK’s report “Taken,” by Yoshi Yamamoto, published in the spring of 2011. While I do hope that, if she is indeed alive and separated from her family, Mun Su Gyong will be reunited with her loved ones, one has to remember: 82,959 South Koreans were abducted by North Korea during the Korean War; 3,824 South Koreans, most of them fishermen, have been abducted since the July 27, 1953 Korean War Armistice; 93,000 ethnic Koreans residing in Japan were lured back to North Korea and never allowed to leave, many of them trapped together with Japanese spouses; hundreds of Japanese and Chinese nationals have been abducted to North Korea; and at least 25 nationals of countries other than South Korea, Japan, and China have been reportedly taken against their will. With 180,108 nationals of South Korea and other countries taken by North Korea, that regime must provide a full accounting of those abducted and detained, facilitate the reunification of abductees’ families, return the remains of deceased abductees, and observe the right of freedom of movement by allowing the surviving abductees to return to their families. With abductions by North Korea featured prominently in UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK Marzuki Darusman’s most recent September 8, 2015 report to the General Assembly, this issue is here to stay. The North Korean regime should rest assured that its attempts to muddy the waters and run anti-human rights media campaigns will, once again, be doomed to failure.

With 180,108 nationals of South Korea and other countries taken by North Korea, that regime must provide a full accounting of those abducted and detained, facilitate the reunification of abductees’ families, return the remains of deceased abductees, and observe the right of freedom of movement by allowing the surviving abductees to return to their families. 

To download a free PDF copy of “Taken,” go to: http://hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Taken_LQ.pdf.

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Categories: CNN, ColdWar, DPRK, HRNK, hrnkus, humanrights, KimJongUn, NK, nonprofit, NorthKorea, southkorea, UN, UNCOI, UNGA

Statement of Roberta Cohen at the Launch of "Hidden Gulag IV: Gender Repression and Prisoner Disappearances" and "Camp 15 Imagery Update"

© 2015 Committee for Human Rights in North Korea

by Roberta Cohen, HRNK Co-Chair Emeritus

STATEMENT OF ROBERTA COHEN, CO-CHAIR, COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA ON THE LAUNCH OF “HIDDEN GULAG IV: GENDER REPRESSION AND PRISONER DISAPPEARANCES & CAMP 15 IMAGERY UPDATE” AT THE NEWSEUM, SEPTEMBER 18, 2015

I find the reports of David Hawk and Joe Bermudez significant because they make everyone so uncomfortable. Most people don’t want to know about the camps, especially diplomats who hope to negotiate with North Korea, humanitarian organizations on the ground seeking to get along with the host government, and all other parties who want to engage with Pyongyang and feel good about their doing so. These reports provide inconvenient information. It puts a human face on the political prison and re-education camps by providing testimonies of survivors, satellite imagery of camps, and for the first time a list of 181 incarcerated prisoners from Kwan-li-so Camp 15. 

David's report brings to light how women in North Korea are facing particular repression. Most of the North Koreans today who cross the border illegally are women trying to improve their lives and the lives of their families. Increasingly they are arrested, ill-treated and imprisoned. I am pleased the United States recently called for the release of female political prisoners around the world and singled out North Korea. 

The Hawk and Bermudez reports are also significant because they provide evidence that can be used in future trials against the Kim Jong-un regime. Since the UN Commission of Inquiry report of 2014, the need for accountability has begun to take root. Last year, the United Nations General Assembly called upon the Security Council to consider referring the North Korean human rights situation to the International Criminal Court. It also called for targeted sanctions against those most responsible. And a UN human rights office has been set up in Seoul to compile information with a view to accountability. 

Accountability is essential to address deliberate state policies of starvation of prisoners, lack of medical attention, forced labor and beatings. Such practices are estimated to have led to over one hundred thousand deaths in the political prison camps over the past 50 years. Yet there seems to be an international reticence when it comes to demanding access to these camps. The United States to its credit began two to three years ago to speak out strongly against the camps and about accountability. And UN resolutions have called upon North Korea to release all political prisoners unconditionally. But one doesn’t hear much about governments coming together to make joint demarches or intercessions on a regular basis for access to these camps. One doesn’t hear a drumbeat internationally to gain entry. But there should be one because camp commanders, the officials issuing the orders to them and those carrying them out, need to become aware that what they are doing constitutes crimes against humanity and could lead to their being brought before a court in the future. South Korean experts have actually reported anecdotal evidence that commanders in some detention centers may have modified practices out of fear of possible future prosecution. Accountability has rattled the Kim Jong-un regime. Last year the focus at the UN on the ICC led the DPRK to offer for the first time visits for the High Commissioner for Human Rights and other UN officials in order to try to remove from a General Assembly resolution the reference to accountability. 

Of the 181 prisoners listed in the Hawk report, more than 120 are reported to be missing. Their names should be part of dialogues developed with North Korea and part of demarches or statements. Where are these people? It is time for the international community to call for an accounting of prisoners—their whereabouts, the reasons for their incarceration, whether family members are held with them, whether they have perished. The UN General Assembly has called upon states that have relations with North Korea to use their influence to encourage the closure of political prison camps. But no joint strategy yet exists. 

Contingency plans being developed by different governments to deal with any sudden change in North Korea should include strategies for bringing political prisoners to safety. The UN Commission of Inquiry reported the existence of standing orders at the political prison camps to kill all prisoners in the event of conflict or revolution. The purpose of these orders is to destroy the evidence. While it’s impossible to know whether anything can be done to stop this, publicizing this information is important. And including prisoner protection in contingency planning should be urged. The Atrocities Prevention Board established in the United States in 2012 should have on its agenda as a standing item–the risk of potential massacre of North Korean political prisoners. And the U.S. should begin to add names of persons and entities engaged in serious human rights abuses in the camps to the sanctions list under the President’s executive order of January 2015. NGOs for their part should be sending information to the International Criminal Court. Even though the prosecutor cannot now address the situation, the NGOs can publicize the information with a view to future accountability. This might reach the attention of camp officials and sow doubt among North Korea’s elites.

At the present time, the situation is especially precarious for prisoners. Drought is plaguing North Korea and serious food shortages are predicted. In the past when there has been serious malnutrition and starvation in parts of the country, prisoners have suffered disproportionately. They have been left to eat grass and rats. 

Do international humanitarian agencies and NGOs on the ground have a responsibility? Yes, their stated goal is to reach the most vulnerable in the country. They should begin to compile privately whatever information they can find about starvation and disease in the camps and hammer out strategies to gain entry, in particular for organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross. 

North Korea’s population could actually benefit from allowing the World Health Organization entry to the camps. Tuberculosis is on the rise in the country and reported to be rampant in the camps. The WHO has found in other countries that effective TB control in prisons protects the community at large. Shouldn’t the UN encourage the WHO to gain entry to the camps to try to help eradicate TB from the country? And shouldn’t improved treatment of women—another goal of the UN—extend to women prisoners in North Korea? The Secretary-General introduced a Human Rights Up Front Approach in 2013 that calls upon the entire UN system, when faced with serious violations of human rights, to develop a system wide strategy. This approach needs to be applied to North Korea, and HRNK has been calling upon the UN to do so. North Korea’s government must receive the message that the camps in North Korea are a blight on the civilized world and on any aspirations North Korea might have to improve its relationships with other countries and receive the political, economic and investment support it badly needs for its development.

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Categories: committeehrnk, DPRK, HRNK, hrnkus, humanrights, KimJongUn, NGO, TB, UN, UNCOI, UNGA, UNHRC, WashingtonDC, WHO

Training North Korea’s Supreme Leader

By Robert Collins 

How does one train a “supreme leader”—especially a young and inexperienced one—on how to handle crisis when any mention of his mistakes may lead to the notorious termination of the trainer by anti-aircraft gun? Difficult question, to be sure, but an even more difficult process. After all, North Korea had never gone to any external crisis of this depth under the short reign of Kim Jong-un, the North’s hereditary First Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, and Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army. Now it has.

During the past two weeks, the two Koreas have once again put on shows of military force in responses and counter-responses to the North’s planting of landmines in the Demilitarized Zone that maimed two young South Korean soldiers. The South’s response was to resume loudspeaker broadcasts across the DMZ, designed to attack and undermine the legitimacy of the regime. Essentially, these types of South Korean propaganda targeting the North’s leadership drive that same leadership up the proverbial wall. A series of kinetic responses and counter-responses elevated a provocation into a crisis requiring raises in military alerts, shows of great force on both sides and, finally, face-to-face negotiations at Panmunjom in the DMZ.

So how much “training the trainer” went into planning for these actions? Driven by fear for their lives, North Korea’s generals and admirals must couch their recommendations on courses of action within the cocoon of absolute and bellicose loyalty to the supreme leader. Most likely, they must parse their requests and answers in strategy deliberations in such a manner that makes any suggestion by Kim Jong-un appear to be sheer tactical brilliance reminiscent of Sun Tzu, Napoleon, or, even better for North Koreans, of the much celebrated greatness of the supreme leader’s grandfather, Kim Il-sung.

This loyalty demanded by the North’s incessantly inculcated ideology has definitively negative by-products that have the world’s attention—impetuous purges and executions of senior leaders, human rights denial, political prison camps; imprisoning up to 120,000 inmates; and resource de-prioritization for any individual North Korean perceived by the regime as not faithfully serving the interests of the supreme leader.  

When North Korea and South Korea held talks at Panmunjom beginning on August 22 to defuse this most recent crisis, it was a meeting of two sides whose characteristics are dramatically different. Not only are the two political systems antithetical, but their social and ideological values are antithetical as well. The backgrounds of the four South and North Korean participating delegates are polar opposites, both politically and militarily. Their backgrounds clearly indicate that the South is at the negotiating table because it values the safety of its citizens and the North is at the talks because it values the “face,” i.e. the reputation of its supreme leader over everything else.

How so? The intent and values of the South are self-evident. Democratic societies look to preservation and safety of their nation-state above all else, as essential in safeguarding the human security of their citizens. The presence of President Park’s National Security Adviser, Kim Kwan-jin, and her Minister of Unification, Hong Yong-pyo, demonstrates that resolving this crisis focused on the security of the South. Kim Kwan-jin is a lifelong military man who has commanded army units from the company-level up through field army and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, followed by a stint as the Minister of National Defense. Hong Yong-pyo serves as the leader of the government agency dedicated to finding peaceful means of unification. However, on the North’s side, there are polar opposites. The one man in the group who wore a military uniform with a military rank of vice-marshal (5-star) was the North’s Hwang Byong-so. Oddly enough, he is not truly a military man. He is a lifelong political commissar who has worked for the Korean Workers’ Party his whole life. He has never commanded a battalion, a regiment, a division, a corps, or a field army… ever. His job has always been to monitor North Korea’s military officers to ensure their loyalty to the supreme leader and the party as well as their compliance with all aspects of North Korean ideology. Hwang’s function has always been to ensure that those officers that supposedly fail to meet that standard are purged from the military ranks. In the first three and a half years of his rule, Kim Jong-un has gone through four Chiefs of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army and six Ministers of People’s Armed Forces. The other North Korean negotiator, Kim Yang-gon, heads the party’s United Front Department, tasked to foment South Korean social and political instability by employing a “toolkit,” including espionage, sabotage, propaganda and even inter-Korean dialogue.  

The final agreement by the four to end the crisis was a statement of regret (the same language Kim Il-sung used after the DMZ axe murders in 1976) from the North concerning the landmine incident and the end of the South’s propaganda broadcasts across the DMZ. As the profiles of the four negotiators indicate, while South Korea’s concern was the security of its soldiers, North Korea’s concern was the security and reputation of its supreme leader.  

In the long run, training the supreme leader may have created a larger mutated political logic in the mind of the Supreme Commander of 1.2 million soldiers armed with nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Future trainers—at least those who survive the purges—will deal with a supreme leader who thinks he now knows it all. Decision-making within the North’s national security structure will likely lose some operational and strategic agility due to his hubris. To emphasize this, Kim Jong-un will likely demonstrate his leadership through internal propaganda claims of having made the Republic of Korea-United States alliance “stand down.”  

One of the outcomes of this crisis is that it will work toward consolidating Kim Jong-un’s power, at least in the young leader’s mind. Surely, it is still possible for an individual or a group of senior officials to fall on their sword after using it on the young, impetuous leader. But for the time being, the outcome of the crisis also enables the continued suppression of the North Korean people, including denial of the most basic of human rights and political prison camp internment of those perceived as disloyal. Another outcome of the crisis is the continued threat to the security of 51 million South Korean citizens, not to mention the threat of nuclear war.

The North’s military trainers may have made themselves look good in the eyes of the supreme leader for now, but the next time he may be the one “training the trainers” on further threats to the people of both North and South Korea.

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Categories: committeehrnk, conflict, dictatorship, HRNK, hrnkus, humanrights, KimJongUn, KWP, military, NK, nonprofit, NorthKorea, RobertCollins, training, WashingtonDC

Lenin’s Theory of Utility

By Robert Collins

The concept of manipulating others to promote one’s own cause is no doubt millennia old.  It is not an original thought by Lenin.  Those that employed this concept likely existed in the ancient Egyptian dynasties, the Roman Empire and most other political realms, as well as Lenin’s establishment of the communist domain.  Utility is a fascinating concept that somewhat defies logical description – support for an external cause through belief that one’s vision of right will prevail though it contradicts political reality.

Lenin’s theory of utility is based in those that find benefit and comfort from others who are willing to deceive themselves about another’s intent in order to comfort themselves in their view of the world.   To feel good about one’s contribution to a false premise is indeed comforting if one chooses to either ignore reality or choose not to accept political discomfort.  In one recent case, choosing to support the values of human rights denial versus support for the defense of democracy and human rights based upon one’s observation that “I talked to them and they seemed real and sincere” is to ignore human dignity and succumb to the propaganda of deception.

When Code Pink and WomenCrossDMZ visited North Korea they did so without having an appreciation for Lenin’s theory.  The fact that these women met and conversed with North Korean women was apparently, in their minds, a major victory for human rights if one believes their testimony once they crossed the DMZ.  Women of note from among those that crossed praised their opportunity to speak to North Korean leaders and agree that the term “human rights” was included in their statement.  Was there utility for the North Koreans to agree to do so?

Within the context of North Korea’s propaganda-dominated diplomacy, the answer would most certainly be yes.  To be sure, Lenin would have been proud to include it in a statement that had no impact on the reality of his rule.  The same goes for the Kim Family Regime. The North Korean woman who talked to a representative of Code Pink or WomenCrossDMZ was surely not so fortunate to be so self-deceived.  The North Korean woman, or group of women, whom the DMZ crossers so eloquently praised was prepped to say what the party-state wanted them to say – to the last syllable.  That woman has been indoctrinated since she was in pre-school on how to think, what to say, and how to obey the party.  She met her first official propagandist at the age of seven and listened to that person present how the United States was evil to the core and South Korea was merely puppets in the hands of Washington, DC.  Her parents were compelled to listen to the propaganda put out by the education director at every level, the neighborhood unit chief in every local community, and the individual work-line propagandist who gave verbal feedback to everything they admitted during daily and/or weekly self-critique sessions. She has been compelled throughout her lifetime to do the same as her parents. She studied how North Korea’s supreme leader was always right and all had to worship him and do his bidding by serving the wishes of the Korean Workers’ Party.  And yes, that they had to comply with the collective and do so through self-reliance.  But self-reliance in North Korea is more akin to survival in an environment of unparalleled political terror, rather than self-motivation. Even if she had learned that what she heard was absurd – and it is – the secret police prepped her for every meeting and debriefed her on every word that was said.  Every meeting that the Code Pink/WomenCrossDMZ had with individual North Koreans was planned, rehearsed and vetted before it took place. Every North Korean engager of the Code Pink/WomenCrossDMZ was required to report what they heard from every North Korean in their small team, not to mention that based on the secret police’s well-known tactics, there were several undercover secret police female officers within the group as well.

What benefit is there for the Kim Regime in doing this?  The party and the police state control “the happening” and learn how to do a better job with those that serve Lenin’s Theory of Utility by developing such sub-theorems as Kim Jong-un’s Theorem on Manipulating Western Naiveté, or secret police commander General Kim Won-hung’s Theorem on Personal Deception.  

How do we know of this propaganda, deception and the employment of the utility theory?  Every one of the 27,000 North Korean defectors to South Korea has told us as much – in great detail.  Their testimony of human rights denial, political terror, and mental and physical brutality are legion.  Every one of them understands Lenin’s Theory of Utility.  Apparently, such theories are beyond the understanding or at least the appreciation of Code Pink/WomenCrossDMZ.  Useful? You bet…just ask the 27,000.

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Categories: dictatorship, DMZ, DPRK, HRNK, hrnkus, humanrights, KimJongUn, KoreanWar, lenin, manipulation, NK, nonprofit, NorthKorea, RobertCollins, southkorea, theoryofutility

Unusual Activity at the Kanggon Military Training Area in North Korea: Evidence of Execution by Anti-aircraft Machine Guns?

Authors: 

Greg Scarlatoiu (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)
Joseph Bermudez Jr. (AllSource Analysis, Inc.)

While examining satellite imagery of an area near the North Korean capital city, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and AllSource Analysis, Inc. (ASA) may have come across evidence of a ghastly sight: the public execution of several individuals by anti-aircraft machine gun fire.

A military training area generally known as the Kanggon Military Training Area is located approximately 22 km north of the capital city Pyongyang (Pyongyang-si). Given the size, composition, and location of the training facility, it is likely used by both the students and staff of the elite Kanggon Military Academy (6 km to the southwest) and units from either the Pyongyang Defense Command or the Ministry of State Security. Encompassing approximately 12km^2, the training area is composed of a number of dispersed small facilities. One of those facilities, located 1.5 km northeast of the small village of Sŏngi-ri, is a small arms firing range (39. 13 48.64° N, 125. 45 29.03° E). This firing range is approximately 100 meters long by 60 meters wide and consists of 11 firing lanes. A range control/viewing gallery and parking area are located immediately south of the firing range. A small drainage ditch horizontally bisects the firing range. This firing range is typical of many ranges throughout North Korea and is designed for small arms training and maintaining proficiency for weapons ranging from pistols to light machine guns, and chambered for 7.62mm (the standard AK-47 rifle round) or less.

Sometime on or about October 7th, 2014, some very unusual activity was noted on satellite imagery of the Kanggon small arms firing range. Instead of troops occupying the firing positions on the range there was a battery of six ZPU-4 anti-aircraft guns lined up between the firing positions and the range control/viewing gallery. The ZPU-4 is an anti-aircraft gun system consisting of four 14.5mm heavy machine guns (similar to a U.S. .50 caliber heavy machine gun) mounted on a towed wheeled chassis. It is neither safe nor practical to use such weapons on a small arms range, as the combined weight of fire from the six ZPU-4 (a total of 24 heavy machine guns) would quickly destroy the downrange backstop and necessitate reconstruction. A few meters behind the ZPU-4s there appears to be either a line of troops or equipment, while farther back are five trucks (of various sizes), one large trailer, and one bus. This suggests that senior officers or VIPs may have come to observe whatever activity was taking place. Most unusual in the image, perhaps, is what appears to be some sort of targets located only 30 meters downrange of the ZPU-4s.

The satellite image appears to have been taken moments before an execution by ZPU-4 anti-aircraft machine guns. Busing in senior officers or VIPs to observe a ZPU-4 dry-fire training exercise at a small arms range amidst North Korea’s fuel shortages would make no sense. If the ZPU-4s were brought to the range solely to be sighted in, conducting this exercise at a 100 meter small arms firing range would be impractical. A live-fire exercise would be even more nonsensical. Rounds fired by a ZPU-4 have a range of 8,000 m and can reach a maximum altitude of 5,000 m. Positioning a battery of six ZPU-4s to fire horizontally at targets situated only 30 m downrange could have no conceivable utility from a military viewpoint. The most plausible explanation of the scene captured in the October 7th satellite image is a gruesome public execution. Anyone who has witnessed the damage one single U.S. .50 caliber round does to the human body will shudder just trying to imagine a battery of 24 heavy machine guns being fired at human beings. Bodies would be nearly pulverized. The gut-wrenching viciousness of such an act would make “cruel and unusual punishment” sound like a gross understatement.

Given reports of past executions this is tragic, but unfortunately plausible in the twisted world of Kim Jong-un’s North Korea. In December 2013, following the execution of the leader’s uncle Jang Song-thaek, Choe Sang-Hun and David Sanger reported for The New York Times that Jang Song-thaek’s top two lieutenants had been executed using anti-aircraft machine guns.[1]In the summer of 2013, South Korean intelligence officials and news media reported that purged North Korean artists had been executed using the same gruesome method.

The purge that began in early 2009, as the regime began preparing for the second hereditary transmission of power, continues. On April 29^th, 2015, Associated Press reported that, according to South Korean intelligence sources quoted by ROK National Assemblyman Shin Kyoung-min, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un ordered the execution of 15 senior officials this year. According to Assemblyman Shin, the officials were accused of challenging the supreme leader’s authority. One of them, a vice Cabinet minister, “was executed in January for questioning Kim’s policies on forestation.” [2]

On April 13th, 2015, Dr. Stephan Haggard and HRNK board member Marcus Noland (Executive Vice President and Director of Studies, Peterson Institute for International Economics) drew attention to a quotation from New Focus International in a North Korea: Witness to Transformation article.[3] New Focus indicated that, following instructions received from the top leadership, North Korea’s State Security Department (SSD) and Ministry of People’s Security (MPS) launched the so-called “9.8 measures” in the fall of 2014. The measures involved the further “militarization of State Security and People’s Security,” so that surveillance, control, coercion, and punishment could be carried out more effectively.  

Some of the directives in this new, broad initiative included the following:

“’[M]ost criminals who are forgiven are likely to commit another crime’…‘the time has come when words are not enough. The sound of gunshot must accompany the destruction of impure and hostile elements, and when necessary, public executions are to be used so that the masses come to their senses.’” According to New Focus, the directives allegedly ratified the following clause, seemingly instigating extra-judicial killings: “If an anti-regime act is uncovered, State Security soldiers are to judge and execute by gunfire of their own accord, and afterwards file a report on the person and crime to Pyongyang.”[4]

If true, the “9.8 measures” instructing agents of the state to shoot to kill fellow North Koreans constitute a flagrant violation of Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which stipulates that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”[5]Furthermore, public execution by way of heavy machine gun fire is arguably a violation of ICCPR Article 7, which states, in part, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”[6]North Korea acceded to the ICCPR in 1981.[7] In its 2014 White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea, the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) notes that public executions have been reportedly more frequent in North Korea since the late 2009 confiscatory currency reform.[8]KINU further anticipates that this trend is not likely to subside in the near future, due to “the tightening of internal control under Kim Jong-un’s regime.”[9]

The report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (UN COI) established that, “as a matter of State policy, the authorities carry out executions, with or without trial, publicly or secretly, in response to political and other crimes that are often not among the most serious crimes.”[10]The UN COI report further determined that the policy of regularly carrying out public executions serves to instill fear in the general population.”[11]The report, released in February 2014, noted that, as of late 2013, “there appeared to be a spike in the number of politically motivated public executions.”[12] Public executions are one of the dreadful tools employed in the implementation of the Kim Jong-un regime’s “fearpolitik.”[13]

Kanggon Small Arms Firing Range, October 16th, 2014, ZPU-4 systems or targets not present.

(© DigitalGlobe 2015)

ZPU-4 Anti-aircraft Machine Gun System (Photo credit: U.S. Army)

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[1] Choe Sang-Hun and David Sanger, Korea Execution Is Tied to Clash Over Business, The New York Times, Dec. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/24/world/asia/north-korea-purge.html?_r=0.

[2] Associated Press. S. Korea Says Kim Jong Un Executed 15 Officials This Year. Story relayed in , The New York Times, Apr. 29, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/04/29/world/asia/ap-as-koreas-tension-.html?_r=0

[3] New Focus International, North Korea’s State Security and People’s Security Ministries Implement ‘9.8 Measures,’ New Focus International, Apr. 12, 2015, http://newfocusintl.com/exclusive-north-koreas-state-security-and-peoples-security-ministries-implement-9-8-measures/.

[4] Stephan Haggard, Slave to the Blog: Trojan Horse Edition, Witness to Transformation (blog), Apr. 13, 2015, http://blogs.piie.com/nk/?p=14032.

[5] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6, http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx.

[6] Id. at Article 7.

[7] OHCHR, Status of Ratification: Interactive Dashboard, http://indicators.ohchr.org/.

[8] Han Dong-ho et al., 2014 White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea, Korea Institute of National Unification (KINU), 115, http://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/pub/pub_04_01.jsp?bid=DATA04&page=1&num=40&mode=view&category=.

[9] Id. at 26.

[10] Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, UN Human Rights Council, 25^th sess., Agenda Item 4, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/63, p. 12, para. 63 (7 February 2014), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/ReportoftheCommissionofInquiryDPRK.aspx(hereinafter “COI Report”).

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] Voice of America (VOA), North Korea Human Rights Outlook for 2014…‘Concerning of Political Camps Expansion and Reign of Terror,’HRNK Insider, Jan. 3, 2014, http://www.hrnkinsider.org/2014_01_01_archive.html.

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Categories: committeehrnk, DPRK, fearpolitik, HRNK, humanrights, KimJongUn, NK, NorthKorea, UN, UNCOI, USA, WashingtonDC